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Abstract
While many review articles exist on (deterministic) lot sizing models used
in the context of price and quantity discounts, buyer-vendor coordination,
supply chain management, and joint economic lot sizing problems, they do
not convey the impact of important findings which date back to at least 2002,
or, in hindsight, to 1984. As a result, many recent articles still model the
financial implications of lot sizing decisions without having the assurance that
these models would help the firm(s) involved in maximising the Net Present
Value (NPV). This paper therefore reviews these findings, while adding also
its own contributions, as to convey the general importance to lot sizing theory.
We show that the underlying principles used in the four key articles that have
led to a division in modelling approaches are in fact all in line with NPV, and
argue that therefore there should not be these discrepancies that currently
persist in the literature. We establish the connections between these four
strands of literature using the solution to a simple variation of Harris’ EOQ
model, deriving thereby results from Boyaci and Gallego (2002) and Beullens
and Janssens (2011), but showing their general applicability to any type of
supply-chain structure. The breath of implications to deterministic lot sizing
theory is illustrated using practical examples. We present a stochastic version
of the model of Crowther (1964), which is arguably the least understood and
applied model, but on the other hand the most important one in realising
how these modelling strands can be unified.
Keywords: deterministic inventory, buyer-vendor coordination, joint
economic lot sizing, quantity discounts, multi-echelon, pricing, net present
value, stochastic regenerative demand
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1. Introduction
A theory of lot sizing is a set of models and algorithms to help find an
optimal way of transferring batches of products through a supply chain in
which these products undergo transformation, are held in stock, and are
being moved on to the next stage(s). Such a theory would not be complete
if it did not contain a set of founding principles that help explain in which
context which models are applicable.
In particular, a firm may be interested in finding out how to model the
impact that lot-sizing decisions will have on its future average profit. Since
Harris (1913), it is well-known that lot sizing leads to financial holding costs
that depend on the firm’s opportunity cost of capital α. Key contributions
to the theory that allows a more refined investigation were made in Hadley
(1964), Grubbstro¨m (1967), Grubbstro¨m (1980), Porteus (1985), Haneveld
and Teunter (1998), Van der Laan and Teunter (2002) and Boyaci and Gal-
lego (2002). At the time of writing, more than a decade later, this should
have generated an important shift in modelling the financial implications
of lot-sizing, in particular in the context of price/quantity discounts, joint
economic lot-sizing, and supply chain coordination. However, there are still
numerous contributions being published which are demonstrably not in line
with these results (see Section 9). No review article has done justice to
the implications that should have followed; any discussion on this topic is
surprisingly absent in recent review articles. This discrepancy justifies the
publication of a review-type paper with a focus on explaining the generality
of these principles and demonstrating their practical implications.
Contributions. Given the above discrepancy found in the current liter-
ature, this paper’s first aim is to bring a cohesive and accessible report of the
key findings from the above articles, and the few more recent relevant articles,
as to convey an appreciation of the general impact on modelling the financial
implications of lot-sizing. To this aim, we naturally ‘reproduce’ some of the
results previously obtained, but also offer some new contributions. The ori-
gins of the four key strands of lot-sizing modelling approaches can be traced
back to Harris (1913), Clark (1958), Crowther (1964), and Monahan (1984).
Differences between the models of Crowther and Monahan, and implications
for coordination, are discussed in Boyaci and Gallego (2002), and links to
Harris and Clark are identified in Beullens and Janssens (2011). What this
paper adds to this discussion is a deeper understanding: by reviewing the
underlying reasoning of the authors of these classic papers, we see that there
2
is in fact an important connection not previously recognised. We prove how
this could have led to an alternative history in which the current discrepan-
cies in modelling approaches would not have existed, but would have been
replaced by one unified approach, from as early as 1984.
In Harris (1913), when deriving the financial value of the average stock,
Harris mentions that an irregular demand pattern would add additional com-
plication, but concludes that it can generally be neglected or applied as a
correction factor to the result. What Harris really meant with this comment
is not known, but various plausible interpretations have been investigated
(see Section 3). In this paper we will assign a different interpretation to
Harris’ comment about irregular demand patterns to arrive at a simple ex-
tension of his EOQ model. This model (in Section 3) is used to prove the
connections between the four strands of lot sizing models investigated. Boy-
aci and Gallego (2002) were arguably first in deriving this result for the single
supplier - multiple buyers setting, and Beullens and Janssens (2011) for the
serial multi-echelon supply chain. Our contribution here, by viewing it as
the result of an extension to Harris’ model, is one of insight, namely, that
the result represents the profit function of most firms more accurately in any
supply-chain configuration. This is of pedagogical interest, since the gen-
erality of the key insight can be conveyed in a very natural manner in any
introductory textbook on the topic of lot sizing.
As we will see, it is Crowther’s model that is the key ingredient that
is either missing or misinterpreted in the mainstream literature, while it
nevertheless should appear naturally as part of the profit function of a firm.
So far, (the relevance of) Crowther’s model has only been shown to apply in
deterministic models. In this paper, we generalise the profit function of the
firm derived in Section 3 and derive a stochastic version of Crowther’s model
(Section 10). This proves its relevance beyond deterministic models, and the
result also opens new avenues for further research.
To show the practical implications of this more unified theory to de-
terministic lot sizing theory, we present seven examples (Section 7) that
complement those presented in earlier work. We illustrate why some classic
inventory models will: (1) underestimate the value of price discounts and do
not find the optimal scheme; (2) underestimate the value a firm is willing
to invest in reducing its unit purchase price; (3) underestimate the value of
joint lotsizing and do not find the joint optimal solution; (4) miscalculate
side-payments that firms should exchange in order to arrive at a Nash Equi-
librium; and, (5) how these errors will propagate in a multi-echelon supply
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chain. We further show: (6) the impact of payment structures, and (7) that
the conditions under which the archetypal Joint Economic Lot Sizing (JELS)
models can lead to equivalent results as those derived from NPV principles
should necessarily deviate from the so-called ‘conventional’ payment assump-
tions (see further). In particular, we present two specific payment structures
under which some JELS models from the literature do lead to results that
are equivalent to NPV-derived JELS models. In general, we show that JELS
research should pay explicit attention to the underlying payment structures
if insights are to be derived concerning the relative benefits to the individual
firms of adopting JELS solutions. This should be an important component
of such research, but it is often missing.
Methodology. The main vehicle for our investigation is the use of Net
Present Value (NPV) reference models. NPV modelling has been used at
least for fifty years to check whether the lot sizing models we investigate are
capable of maximising the NPV of the future profits of the firm(s) involved.
The NPV value to the firm of its lot sizing activity is found as the Laplace
transform of a cash-flow function (Grubbstro¨m, 1967) in which the Laplace
frequency is taken to be the firm’s opportunity cost of capital rate α. As in
Hadley (1964) and Grubbstro¨m (1980), we construct from this the Annuity
Stream (AS) function. The AS is the constant stream of payments having
the same NPV as a given stream of payments. In line with the models under
investigation, we consider a continuous time and infinite horizon situation,
and hence AS ≡ αNPV. The linear approximation of exponential terms
in α (containing decision variables) results in a profit function that can be
compared with the functions in the classic lot sizing models.
The validity of a linearised model in approximating the AS is limited
to situations in which cycle times are not much larger than one year, when
α ≈ 0.2 (time measured in years). This is an acceptable limitation in many
applications. Throughout its presentation, this paper assumes that payments
for set-ups and production or procurement occur in full whenever a batch
arrives at the firm, unless otherwise stated. This is called a conventional
payment structure in Beullens and Janssens (2013). In Section 7.6 we extend
this to a class of other payment structures, and show that by using a suitable
substitution of parameters, the functional forms of the terms obtained under
conventional payment structures are preserved.
Despite the technique of NPV-based modelling being quite well-known,
it is somewhat surprising that the model of Crowther (1964) was not investi-
gated in this manner until Boyaci and Gallego (2002), and that these findings
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do not seem to have made much of an impact as of yet (see Section 9). This
article is therefore also a tribute to these authors, in the hope that future lot
sizing theory will recognise the importance of their contributions. In Section
10, we transfer this key result to a stochastic setting by presenting, to our
knowledge, the first NPV-derived stochastic version of the model of Crowther
(1964).
The article’s further organisation follows an order based on logic rather
than chronology. We therefore introduce the extension of Harris’ model us-
ing NPV-principles after the discussion of Harris (1913), and discuss Clark
(1958) after Crowther (1964) and Monahan (1984). We postpone a discus-
sion on relevant literature (Sections 8 and 9), after having established the
key insights. Since models from various sources are discussed and compared,
we introduce our own set of notation in an aim to be consistent throughout,
but we pay careful attention to reproduce the original results accurately.
2. Harris (1913)
In the EOQ problem (Harris, 1913), a firm is to satisfy without shortages
a constant demand rate y per unit of time for an item, by procuring or
producing at infinite rate in batches of equal size Q = yT per unit of item,
where T is the cycle time. The cost for acquiring each unit of item is c, and
the generation of each batch results in a fixed set-up cost s. The cost for
interest and depreciation on stock is α per monetary unit and unit of time.
All other parameters given constants, the optimal lot-size Q that minimises
the whole cost per unit of item and unit of time, and which is the sum of
interest charges, set-up costs, and purchasing costs, as given by:
α
2y
(cQ+ s) +
s
Q
+ c, (1)
is found to be Q∗ =
√
2sy/αc. In addition to the derivation of this main
result, Harris introduces the concepts of order lead-time and reorder point,
and discusses their relationship; provides insight into the (in)sensitivity but
asymmetry in the total costs around Q∗; and argues that the simplicity of
the formula makes it easy to apply in practise.
Much of his reasoning remains convincing to date, and has been recon-
firmed by extensive additional analysis. The EOQ model, for example, has
been shown to be fairly accurately in line with the principle of maximising
the Net Present Value (NPV) of the firm. For this purpose, one proposes a
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reference NPV model based on assumptions about an underlying cash-flow
function for the firm. The simplest NPV model would take it that both s
and cQ are paid out in full the moment a batch arrives, and that the first
batch arrives at decision time 0 (i.e. the conventional payment structure,
as introduced earlier). As in Hadley (1964), the Annuity Stream (AS) cost
function for the firm is then given by:
C(T ) = (s+ cQ)
∞∑
i=0
αe−iαT =
α(s+ cQ)
(1− e−αT ) , (2)
where α is the continuous capital rate, representing the opportunity cost of
capital for the firm. The Maclaurin expansion of the exponential term in αT
produces1:
C(T ) = (s+ cQ)(
1
T
+
α
2
+
α2T
12
+O(α3)). (3)
It can be verified that the linear approximation of (3) in α, when divided by
y, is indeed given by (1). When payment structures differ, this equivalence
result is no longer guaranteed, see Beullens and Janssens (2013).
The expression (1), while being based on new notation, follows closely
the original manuscript. Multiplication by the demand rate y, dropping the
constant term on the interest charge on s, and substitution of the unit holding
cost h = αc in (1), produces the better known relevant cost function per unit
of time, as in Hillier and Lieberman (2005):
h
Q
2
+ s
y
Q
+ cy, (4)
and Q∗ =
√
2sy/h. The cost function (4) no longer shows the capital cost
of s, and it would be more accurate to use Harris’ original function (1)
for decision problems in which s would be variable. As this term typically
remains insignificant when cycle times are less than a year, however, it is
often acceptable to neglect it2. We will also adopt this simplification in the
examples given in Section 7.
1Note that Disney and Warburton (2012) show how, by using the Lambert W function,
one can obtain an optimal analytical solution to the unapproximated NPV profit function.
2See also Farvid and Rosling (2014), who develop a theoretically even more accurate
method for dealing with set-up costs, of particular interest to stochastic models.
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3. The EOQ for uniform stepsize cumulative demand
Harris’ comment about the potential impact of a deviation from the as-
sumption of a constant demand rate (see Section 1) can receive various inter-
pretations. It is now much better understood in which situations his EOQ
result is robust, see e.g. Peterson and Silver (1985), how to deal with chang-
ing demand patterns through dynamic lot sizing theory (Wagner and Whitin,
1958), and which policies to use in stochastic systems, see e.g. Clark and
Scarf (1960). In this paper we explore the consequences of adopting the as-
sumption that demand in Harris’ model is lumpy but deterministic and such
that the cumulative demand over time follows a staircase of uniform stepsize.
It can be regarded as a simple special case of a dynamic lot sizing problem,
however, special attention is given to the impact of the (potentially variable)
time length between two consecutive demand orders and the corresponding
revenue stream it generates for the firm.
The problem is hence that a firm has to satisfy, without shortages, de-
mand for a product that occurs with a constant average rate y but for which
the cumulative demand follows a staircase function of which each step is of a
uniform height Q and of a uniform length T = Q/y. The unit sales price w is
instantaneously received when the product is taken out of stock to fulfill de-
mand, and a set-up cost sp is incurred to deliver the batch to the customer(s).
The firm wishes to establish a stationary policy of ordering at infinite rate
at a constant lot-size Qs, incurring the set-up cost s when the order arrives,
and facing a unit cost c when placing a product in inventory. Note that we
assume, for now, that Q (and T ) is exogeneous. (For a graphical illustration
of the problem, see Fig. 1 in Grubbstro¨m (2014) in which the demand curve
is now a staircase of uniform steps.)
Theorem 1. The general form of the profit function for the firm facing the
EOQ problem with uniform staircase cumulative demand, taken to be the
linear approximation of its AS profit function, is given by:
Π = (w − c)y − sy
Qs
− spy
Q
− αs+ sp
2
− αcQs
2
+ αw
Q
2
, (5)
and, more specifically for Qs = mQ, as:
Π = (w − c)y − ( s
m
+ sp)
y
Q
− αs+ sp
2
− α(mc− w)Q
2
, (6)
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where the optimal stationary policy is nested with lot-size Qs = m
∗yT , where:
m∗ = b
1 +
√
1 + 8 s
αcyT 2
2
c, (7)
and the optimal time between two consecutive orders is T ∗s = m
∗T .
Proof. The AS profit function of the firm, where Qs = yTs, is of the fol-
lowing form:
Π(Ts) = (wyT − sp)
∞∑
i=0
αe−iαT − (s+ cyTs)
∞∑
i=0
αe−iαTs . (8)
The derivation of the optimal value for Ts from (8) will produce an upper
bound on profits, but will in general be infeasible since the cumulative quan-
tities purchased by the firm at any one point in time must be sufficient to
meet the cumulative demand without backorders. When viewing the system
as a dynamic lot sizing problem with an infinite production rate, it is known
that from both the NPV and the average cost perspective a so-called inner
corner condition must be satisfied, see Grubbstro¨m and Molinder (1994) and
Grubbstro¨m (2014). This means that the firm will only order at moments
when a customer order is to be delivered, or in the terminology introduced in
Roundy (1985), that the policy must be nested. Hence the optimal feasible
lot-size Qs must be of the form Qs = mQ, where m ≥ 1 and integer. The
linear approximation of (8) gives (5), and substitution of Qs = mQ gives
(6), a profit function that is convex with respect to the integer variable m.
In seeking the optimal value for m, say m∗, we follow the approach pre-
sented in Munson and Rosenblatt (2001) that the following conditions must
be satisfied:
Π(m∗ + δ) ≤ Π(m∗), for δ ∈ {1,−1}. (9)
Working out these conditions, and using the properties of quadratic equa-
tions, leads to (7), from which follows that T ∗s = m
∗T . 
Note that by rearranging terms, (6) can be rewritten as:
Π = (w − c)y − ( s
m
+ sp)
y
Q
− αs+ sp
2
− αc(m− 1)Q
2
+ α(w − c)Q
2
, (10)
and we recognise in this the supplier’s profit function first proposed in Boyaci
and Gallego (2002).
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Similarly to the conversion of Harris’ original function (1) to (4), (6) could
be simplified in order to provide only the relevant cost function per unit of
time:
C(m) =
s
m
y
Q
+ hm
Q
2
, (11)
where h = αc can be interpreted as the (relevant) unit holding cost for the
firm. This leads to the same optimal lot-size as given by (7)3. The adoption
of (11) may prove dangerous, however, when investigating situations in which
w, y, or T would be variable, as then a relevant part of the firm’s opportunity
costs and rewards in its profit function is no longer accounted for.
The holding costs for the firm as presented in (11) (and also in (5) and
(6)) do not correspond to the conventional holding costs as found in the
literature, where they would be calculated as being h(m − 1)Q/2 instead
(i.e. the second to last term in (10)). This does not produce a different
result insofar the derivation of m∗ for a given Q is concerned4. However,
the opportunity cost of a change in c, ceteris paribus, will be calculated
differently. See also Section 7.2.
4. Crowther (1964)
About fifty years after Harris’ seminal contribution, Crowther (1964)
presents a model to provide a rationale for quantity discounts offered by
a seller to its buyers. Every buyer is assumed to have an EOQ problem and
derives Harris’ EOQ formula from the average cost function:
Cb(Q) =
sby
Q
+ αw
Q
2
, (12)
where w is the price per unit of product paid to the seller, sb a set-up cost
for ordering, and α the interest rate. The novelty of Crowther’s model is
in presenting the impact on the seller’s cost function when buyers order
according to different values of Q. He argues that if it costs sb to a buyer
to order, it will cost the seller sb to obtain this order. This is of course
3For example, we find (7) derived from a function (11) (in which Q = 1) in Garc´ıa-
Laguna et al. (2010) for their EOQ model with integer lot size.
4The optimality of the integer lot-size ratio for the classic objective function was proven
in Williams (1982).
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not necessarily so5. As in Harris’ model, the average cost to the seller is
sby/Q, and hence larger Q will reduce it. Furthermore, and a crucial step,
Crowther argues that if the buyer purchases in larger lots, the seller enjoys
his profits earlier, which gives him a reinvestment potential in the business
or elsewhere. At interest rate α, and where f is the per cent of profit on an
item, he proposes that the seller’s total gain can be correctly expressed as
αfwQ/2, which also increases for larger Q. The seller’s relevant cost function
is hence:
C(w|Q) = sby
Q
− αfwQ
2
. (13)
For a given w, a larger Q is hence always more profitable to the seller.
Crowther demonstrates that if the seller can induce the buyers to order in
lots sufficiently larger than their EOQ by offering a discount on a listed sales
price w that can at least cover the additional expenses of the buyer, the seller
may enjoy a net reduction on (13). He discusses the concept of sharing profits
through price setting, and offers a strategy for dealing with heterogeneous
buyers and compliance to the Robinson-Patman Act.
Crowther provides numerical examples, and concludes that although the
net savings from quantity discounts appear modest, he argues that firms
typically sell numerous products to even more numerous buyers such that
the total gain is by no means trivial. This paper is not focussing on the
topic of price discounts, but suffice it to say that it is now well researched
that price discounts are rational not only to reduce logistics costs but for
various strategic and marketing reasons, see Dolan (1987) and Munson and
Rosenblatt (1998), and in particular in the case of price-elastic demand, see
e.g. Viswanathan and Wang (2003).
What is more important in the context of this paper is establishing to
which extend Crowther’s model is fundamental to lot sizing theory. We
postpone more detailed comments on the literature to Section 9, but some
important conclusions are well placed here. The literature review reveals that
Crowther’s article, if referenced, is acknowledged to be first in linking quan-
tity discounts to lot sizing cost efficiency in the supply chain. His supplier
cost function in its original conception is, however, rarely explained, even less
reproduced, and almost never applied. To our knowledge, the first article to
5And to model this more general case, he could simply have introduced another pa-
rameter, say sp, having the same interpretation as in Section 3.
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revert back to Crowther’s original model is Drezner and Wesolowsky (1989),
who convert (13) into the following, more general, profit equation6:
P (w|Q) = (w − c)y + α(w − c)Q
2
− spy
Q
, (14)
where c is the unit cost price for the seller and sp is the seller’s specific set-up
cost of acquiring (or delivering) the buyer’s order. Very few articles since
then have used Crowther’s formulation (13) or (14).
Most articles that acknowledge the logistics benefit of larger lot sizes Q for
the seller use the formalism introduced in Dolan (1978) and Lal and Staelin
(1984):
P (w|Q) = (w − c)y + ‘h’Q
2
− spy
Q
, (15)
where ‘h’ is regarded as a constant, and the term in which it is used com-
monly described as the reduction in the supplier’s holding costs. A seemingly
convincing reason for assuming unit holding costs in general to be constant
is that in numerical experiments, and since the price discounts are typically
very small, the assumption produces good results, see e.g. Munson and
Rosenblatt (2001) and Viswanathan and Wang (2003). It also simplifies the
mathematical analysis. These are acceptable justifications in context. How-
ever, the general adoption of this simplification would not do Crowther’s
model justice since it will be shown to be of relevance also to other problems
of supply chain coordination, such as in joint economic lot sizing problems,
and it must hold for any (change in) value of w. It is in principle incorrect to
interpret Crowther’s term as being the negative of the seller’s holding costs
since the correct interpretation of ‘h’ is α(w − c), and hence it is not a unit
holding cost reflecting the opportunity cost of capital invested in stock by
the seller, but a unit supplier’s reward reflecting the opportunity reward of
6Notice that Drezner and Wesolowsky (1989) have made changes to Crowher’s model
by using sp 6= sb and fw = (w − c). The latter is a more robust expression than fw
since this becomes inaccurate for large deviations to w where one would expect f to be a
function of w and not a constant. It is also more general in that the impact of changes to
y are now accurately described. Note that we have changed the sign of the seller’s set-up
cost term in comparison to Drezner and Wesolowsky (1989) to make it consistent with
the common notion in lot sizing theory that it is a cost and not a reward. We also note
that Crowther’s article is, as in many other articles that cite him, wrongly referenced as
published in the year 1967.
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receiving his profits in chunks (and hence earlier) rather than as a constant
annuity stream at the rate of demand y.
It took about fifty years to confirm the equivalence of Harris’ EOQ model
to NPV under conventional payments. Note that Hadley saw this published
in the same year, 1964, as Crowther saw his. It is somewhat surprising that
yet another forty years have had to pass to investigate Crowther’s model
from the NPV viewpoint. To our knowledge, Boyaci and Gallego (2002)
were first in confirming the NPV equivalence of Crowther’s model, when
adopting (14), under the assumption of conventional payments. They retrieve
an interpretation7 of (14) as being accurate in describing the seller’s total
profit function in case that he would produce at infinite rate in lot sizes
equal to Q. They investigate two other payment structures, the multiple
buyers case, and discuss some of the implications for other models in the
literature (see further). Despite this fundamental contribution, and while
Boyaci and Gallego (2002) have received to date a good number of citations,
they are not acknowledged for this result, and their lot sizing models in which
Crowther’s term is incorporated, have not been further used (see also Section
9).
Independently, Beullens and Janssens (2010) also retrieved Crowther’s
term in a linearised AS model of a seller-buyer model under conventional
payments, and called it the supplier’s reward. Results were later published
in Beullens and Janssens (2011) were it was shown to play a role in every
supplier’s profit function in the serial multi-echelon supply chain, as well as
in the EOQ with batch demand model of Grubbstro¨m (1980) and Kim et al.
(1984). It was shown that assumptions about the placement of the so-called
Anchor Point (AP) in the supply chain can affect the valuation of the sum
of holding costs and supplier’s reward to the firm.
It is clear from Theorem 1 that Crowther’s result should be accounted
for by any firm facing such ‘lumpy’ demand. Not accounting for this effect
will underestimate the NPV of the activity for the firm. Also, the impact of
changes to not only Q and w would be misrepresented, but also a change in its
own production or procurement cost structure, as seen from the dependence
on c. Crowther’s contribution is, therefore, not restricted to the study of price
7Indeed, for m = 1, (10) becomes Crowther’s function (when ignoring the constant term
−αsp/2) as given by (14) when adding the set-up cost s to sp. In addition, an alternative
interpretation that proves the optimality of Crowther’s model is to assume that s = 0;
then it is surely optimal to take m = 1 and Crowther’s model (14) applies.
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discounts of a firm with his buyer(s), but of much more general relevance.
5. Monahan (1984)
Exactly twenty years after Crowther’s article was published, Monahan
(1984) provides a concise account, in Section 2 of the article, for the ratio-
nale of quantity discounts from the seller’s perspective. While not referring to
Crowther (1964), it includes Crowther’s main motivation. Monahan’s formu-
lation, in fact, is somewhat more accurate and to the point: ‘This will mean
a shift in both the magnitude and timing of order payments from the buyer.
Hopefully, the vendor will then find he has use of more of the buyer’s money,
earlier in the year. This may be very important to the vendor, depending
upon the size of his particular opportunity cost of capital.’
In developing his main model, Monahan, however, does not account for
this effect. Moreover, he does not account for any inventory-related costs for
the seller. This model can be stated as:
Cb(Q) = wy + sb
y
Q
+ αbw
Q
2
, (16)
for the buyer’s cost function where sb is his set-up cost, αb his opportunity
cost rate, and w the unit price paid to the supplier, and:
P (w|Q) = fwy − sp y
Q
, (17)
as the seller’s profit function, where f is, as in Crowther’s model, the ven-
dor’s gross profit on sales, expressed as a percent8. He then introduces some
extra parameters to model the discount scheme, and analytically derives the
optimal scheme that the seller could use to set his price is such a way that the
buyer’s costs would not increase from adopting the discount scheme, while
the seller would reap all remaining financial benefits. This is, in fact, an
analytical solution to the approach that Crowther suggested. In modern ter-
minology it would be classified as a Stackelberg game with the seller being
the leader. Monahan extends his first model to account for transportation
8It is interesting to note that not only his reasoning, but also this peculiar modelling
logic is the same. This may of course be due to them having consulted similar sources.
Following the logic of Drezner and Wesolowsky (1989), we can replace the first term in
(17) by (w − c)y.
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cost savings for the seller when offered a price discount scheme from the
transporter. This is what Monahan is known for.
Interestingly, however, it is has never been further discussed in the liter-
ature that Monahan, in a final and short section, provides an extension that
does address his earlier comment about the financial benefits to the seller,
and which we have reproduced above. Adopting conventional payments, i.e.
that the buyer pays the seller in full whenever an order is received, the AS
profit function of the seller he arrives at can be represented as9:
(fwQ− sp) (1− e
−α)
(1− e−αQ/y) , (18)
and he stops at this point. From his final comments it is clear that he thought
that is would not produce an analytically tractable model.
If Monahan would have applied the linearisation technique of Hadley
(1964), of which the general applicability to systems of production and in-
ventory was demonstrated in Grubbstro¨m (1980), the linearised AS function
he would have found:
Π(w|Q) = fwy − spy
Q
− αsp
2
+ αfw
Q
2
, (19)
is Crowther’s formulation10! Monahan could then have used this function
instead of (17), and it would have been only slightly more challenging (see also
Section 7.1). This connection has, to our knowledge, never been identified.
It is important, however, as if it had been recognised, it could have led to
the unification of classic lot sizing models as early as 1984.
Having missed this opportunity of realising that an analytically tractable
approach to dealing with Monahan’s AS function (18) exists, future work
building upon Monahan (1984) has not taken up Monahan’s final challenge,
and consequently has not made the connection with Crowther’s contribution.
Most notably, Banerjee (1986) extended (17) to account for a finite produc-
tion rate but lot-for-lot production (i.e. m = 1), Goyal (1988) to the case of
producing in lots of size mQ at infinite production rate, and Joglekar (1988)
to the case of producing in lots of size mQ for an (in)finite production rate.
9We have simplified his equation by removing the extra parameters used for modelling
the discount scheme.
10To be more precise, a function in between Crowther’s original function, and Drezner
and Wesolowsky’s interpretation.
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We can retrieve the case as in Goyal (1988) from Theorem 1 by rear-
ranging terms in (6) to find (10), as discussed previously, showing the short-
comings of Goyal’s model. The insight that Monahan’s main model, and
all models building on it, should have included Crowther’s term from the
NPV-derived viewpoint, was first formulated in Boyaci and Gallego (2002).
Beullens and Janssens (2011) show that this indeed holds for finite produc-
tion rates in the model of Banerjee (1986), under conventional payments, and
Beullens and Janssens (2013) presented similar findings for the general model
of Joglekar (1988) under both conventional and other payment structures.
6. Clark (1958)
A few years before Crowther, Clark (1958) and Clark and Scarf (1960)
laid the foundations for what is now known as multi-echelon inventory the-
ory. Their contribution to inventory theory has arguably been even more
influential than Harris’. The nature of their contribution was the deriva-
tion of optimal policies based on dynamic programming across a serial line
of stocking points or installations, see also Figure 1, and where final de-
mand occuring at the most downstream installation could be stochastic and
dynamic, and where backlogging is permitted. Key to the success of their ap-
proach was the introduction of the concept of a multi-echelon system, which
allowed them to separate the problem into solving a series of single-echelon
problems. This was first proposed in Clark (1958), see also Scarf (2004).
Clark defines an echelon as a system in which the stock is comprised of the
stock at the corresponding installation plus all stock towards and at the next
downstream echelon. In other words, and in the case that lead-times are zero
and backlogging is not allowed, the echelon stock at installation i in Figure 1
is the stock held at installation i, plus all the stock held at the downstream
installations i− 1, ... 1, and not yet sold to the final customers. In addition,
Clark defines the concept of a unit echelon holding cost, explained below.
We now consider the textbook serial multi-echelon inventory system de-
scribed in Hillier and Lieberman (2005) and Silver et al. (1998) and depicted
in Figure 1. This is a severe simplification of the model of Clark and Scarf,
but the assumptions of this simple model are in line with those of models dis-
cussed previously in this paper. There are n echelons, i ∈ N = {1, 2, ..., n},
where echelon i = 1 serves final customer demand according to a determin-
istic constant rate of y units of product per unit of time. Let Q = {Qi |
Qi ∈ <+, i ∈ N ;Qi = miQi−1, i ∈ N \ {1},mi ∈ N \ {0}} be the collec-
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tion of stationary-nested lot-size policies, where echelon 1 receives products
in a lot-size Q1 from echelon 2, echelon i > 1 receives from echelon i + 1
the lot-size Qi = miQi−1, and echelon n always orders the lot-size Qn from
an outside supplier. Each echelon produces at an infinite production rate,
and lead-times are zero. The problem calls for finding a policy from Q that
minimises the supply chain (SC) average costs.
Figure 1: Serial multi-echelon inventory system
The textbook solution extends the approach introduced in Harris (1913)
that the SC-optimal lot-sizes are found from the trade-off between average
set-up costs and average holding costs. A distinction is made between instal-
lation holding costs and echelon holding costs. The former approach leads
to the following SC average cost function AC:
AC =
n∑
i=1
ACi =
n∑
i=1
[
si
y
Qi
+ hiE(Ii)
]
, (20)
where si is fixed cost per order or production set-up; hi the unit holding
cost, which, following Clark (1958), should be based on the ‘value added’ at
installation i plus all the already ‘added value’ in the upstream installations
i + 1 to n; and E(Ii) is the average physical or installation stock held at i:
E(Ii) ≡ mi−12mi Qi for i ∈ N \ {1}, and E(I1) ≡
Q1
2
.
The study of inventories in even this simple supply chain, however, is often
based on Clark’s concepts of echelon stocks and unit echelon holding costs.
The unit echelon holding cost h˜i at echelon i is defined as the holding cost
on the ‘added value’ by converting the product from echelon i+ 1 to echelon
i. It thus holds that hi =
∑n
j=i h˜j, ∀i ∈ N , h˜i = hi − hi+1, ∀i ∈ N \ {n},
and h˜n ≡ hn. It is well-known that the summation over the echelon holding
costs A˜Ci produces:
AC =
n∑
i=1
A˜Ci =
n∑
i=1
[
si
y
Qi
+ h˜iE(I˜i)
]
, (21)
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where E(I˜i) ≡ Qi2 is the average echelon stock of echelon i ∈ N .
Both formulations are equivalent from a total cost point of view. Indeed,
echelon average cost equations A˜Ci = si
y
Qi
+ h˜iE(I˜i) can be retrieved from
the installation average costs equations ACi = si
y
Qi
+ hiE(Ii) by adding the
terms hi
∑i−1
j=1E(Ij) to ACi of each echelon i ∈ N \ {1}, and subtracting the
same terms hi+1
∑i
j=1E(Ij) from the ACi of each echelon i ∈ N \ {n}. This
converts (20) into the equivalent (21). (Likewise, installation costs can be
retrieved from echelon costs by a similar addition and subtracting process.)
The adding and subtracting process of equal terms to different echelons has
a net zero impact on the sum of their costs and justifies the use of echelon
stocks and unit echelon holding costs for supply chain optimisation.
However, it is also clear from the echelon stock and echelon unit holding
cost definitions, and from the above addition and subtraction process, that
ACi 6= A˜Ci. If ACi would represent the true direct costs incurred by echelon
i, then its echelon cost function does not (and vice versa). Clark and Scarf
did not claim that either ACi or A˜Ci is the true cost of installation i. They
were interested in the optimal policy to minimise the total costs in the supply
chain, not in the direct costs (or profits) of an echelon.
Using Theorem 1, we can derive what the profit function of each instal-
lation i would be. Indeed, the structure of the problem for each installation
i > 1 fits the requirements of that model, whereas for the most downstream
installation i = 1 it is an EOQ problem. Let us call an installation a firm
from now on. Instead of using c as the total cost invested per unit of product,
we need to split this up into at least two parts: the amount that is paid out
to the upstream firm for acquiring the materials, and the amount that the
firm itself further invests into the products. To model the first payments, let
W = {wi | wi ∈ <, i ∈ N ∪ {0}} be a set of unit transfer prices, where w0 is
the price the final customer pays to firm 1, wi the transfer price paid by firm
i to firm i + 1, for 1 ≤ i < n, and wn the price firm n pays to the outside
supplier. Let ei denote how much firm i ∈ N invests per unit of product.
This is necessarily paid out to some party external to the collective N .
As a corollary to Theorem 1, we hence obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. The profit function for each firm i > 1 is given by:
Πi = (wi−1 − wi − ei)y − ( si
mi
)
y
Qi−1
− αi si
2
−αi(wi + ei)E(I˜i) + αiwi−1E(I˜i−1), (22)
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in which the last two terms account for the opportunity costs and opportunity
rewards for the firm, respectively, and which can be rewritten as:
−αi(wi + ei)E(Ii) + αi(wi−1 − wi − ei)E(I˜i−1). (23)
Proof. For ci = wi + ei, taking sp = 0, and by adding subscripts to the
other parameters and variables where needed, (6) shows that each firm i > 1
has the profit function Πi:
Πi = (wi−1 − wi − ei)y − ( si
mi
)
y
Qi−1
− αi si
2
−αi(mi(wi + ei)− wi−1)Qi−1
2
. (24)
Substituting the definitions of average installation stocks and average echelon
stocks introduced above, leads to the result. 
Hence, the profit function of each of these suppliers should account for the
opportunity cost using Harris’ unit holding cost αi(wi + ei) and the echelon
stock of the firm, and account for the opportunity reward based on what
we would call a unit revenue reward αiwi−1 and the echelon stock of the
downstream firm. This insight was first derived in Beullens and Janssens
(2011). Note that we have derived their profit functions (for non-zero lead-
times) simply by application of Theorem 1.
For firm 1, the profit function is based on the EOQ model:
Π1 = (w0 − w1 − e1)y − s1 y
Q1
− α1 s1
2
− α1(w1 + e1)Q1
2
. (25)
It is further rewarding to establish the relationship between the total joint
profit function of these firms to the total cost functions (20) and (21). This
is provided by the following two corollaries.
Corollary 2. The total profit function ΠN for the collection of firms N is
given by:
ΠN = (w0 − wn)y −
n∑
i=1
[
eiy +
siy
Qi
+ α
si
2
+ αei
Qi
2
]
− αwnQn
2
, (26)
under the assumption that αi = α, ∀i ∈ N .
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Proof. Take the sum of the profit functions of the individual firms of N as
given by (24) and (25). 
Corollary 3. The terms as a function of lot sizes in ΠN are equivalent to
(20) and (21) if the unit echelon holding costs in the textbook serial multi-
echelon model are h˜i = αiei, ∀i ∈ N\ {n} and h˜n = αn(wn + en).
Proof. This follows easily from inspection. 
It follows that the unit holding costs in the textbook multi-echelon model
must exclude the transfer prices: hi = αi(wn +
∑n
j=i ej), ∀i ∈ N , in order
to correctly represent the SC profit function. Hence, while the profit func-
tions of the individual firms need to account for the transfer prices in their
holding cost terms, as in Harris’ model, the ‘holding cost’ assigned to each
installation in multi-echelon theory should exclude them. It therefore seems
necessary to take a corrective action when using multi-echelon theory prin-
ciples by explicitly stating that these transfer prices are not to be accounted
for, as correctly applied in e.g. Chen et al. (2001). Many models in the
literature do not invoke such corrections, and this may be because this was
not considered in the early seminal work on joint economic lot sizing models,
such as Banerjee (1986), Joglekar (1988) and Goyal (1988). This leads to a
joint profit function which is still a function of the transfer prices, even if
the opportunity cost of capital of all firms are equal. The reason why we do
not run into these problems when deriving the models from NPV principles
is that the supplier’s reward as introduced by Crowther will automatically
be included into the profit functions of the firms, and this ensures that the
process of summation of their invidividual profit functions will lead to the
correct joint profit function that is in line with the multi-echelon principles
of Clark, and this without taking any corrective action. Crowther’s contri-
bution is hence important in making the connection between Harris’s model
and Clark’s multi-echelon principles.
It also follows that, insofar the firm’s opportunity costs are the same, that
there is no difference regarding which profit functions to use between the case
that these firms are really independent and the case that they would represent
business units of a vertically integrated large firm. Confusion around this
issue is evident in the literature, see e.g. Abad (1994). The differences
between independent firms versus an integrated firm have to be rather sought
in the fact that the opportunity cost of capital of individual firms may be
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very different, see Boyaci and Gallego (2002), or that the payment structures
are no longer symmetric, see Beullens and Janssens (2013). This requires
a closer investigation into the implications of corporate finance theory on
models of logistics in supply chains, and multi-echelon lot sizing models in
particular.
The individual profit functions (22) are valid for any value of the transfer
prices under conventional payments. The following two corollaries establish
the conditions under which one may claim that either ACi or A˜Ci would
correctly represent the lot size-related costs to the individual firm in (22),
∀i > 1, or (25) for i = 1. These conditions turn out not to be realistic for the
case of independent firms, as all firms but the most downstream one must
then operate at a net loss.
Corollary 4. For αi > 0, the necessary conditions for ACi to represent
the lot size dependent terms in (22), ∀i > 1, or (25) for i = 1, is that
each echelon i ∈ N\ {1} must charge a unit price equal to its unit cost:
wi−1 = wi + ei. Sufficient conditions for equality are then to take the unit
holding cost hi = αi(wn +
∑n
j=i ej), ∀i ∈ N .
Proof. The set-up cost terms are the same. We have to assume that both
hi and the underlying payment structure is unknown. Comparing ACi in (20)
to (23), and since average echelon stocks E(I˜i−1) can take in general any non-
negative value not equal to E(Ii), it must be that that: (a) wi−1 = wi + ei,
∀i ∈ N\ {1}. Furthermore, it must be that: (b) hi = αi(wi + ei), ∀i ∈ N .
Substitution of result (a) for wi−1 → wi into (b), gives hi = αi(wi+1+ei+1+ei).
Continuing this substitution leads to the above result for hi. These values
for hi are sufficient for any payment structure to fit, but would be necessary
to adopt for conventional payments. 
Corollary 5. For αi > 0, the necessary conditions for A˜Ci to represent the
lot size dependent terms in (22), ∀i > 1, or (25) for i = 1, is that each echelon
i ∈ N\ {1} must charge a zero unit price: wi−1 = 0. Sufficient conditions
for equality are then to take the unit echelon holding cost h˜i = αiei, ∀i ∈ N\
{n}, and h˜n = αn(wn + en).
Proof. The proof is the same, but now based on the comparison of A˜Ci in
(21) to (22). 
It is clear that (5) is not only applicable in the serial supply-chain, but
valid to any firm in any supply-chain configuration facing lumpy demand, as
in e.g. Crowston et al. (1973).
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7. Examples
7.1. Price discounts
We compare the use of (6) as the profit function of the seller to the case
in which Crowther’s term is missing:
Π = (w − c)y − ( s
m
+ sp)
y
Q
− αs+ sp
2
− αc(m− 1)Q
2
, (27)
as in Joglekar (1988), when resolving the price discount problem addressed
in Joglekar (1988). The buyer’s function is as in (16).
In a ‘status quo’ scenario, there is some initial price w. The buyer takes
Q = Q∗ =
√
2sby/(αbw) as to minimise (16). The supplier then determines
m∗(Q∗) by maximising (7) (NPV-approach, i.e. ‘with Crowther’) or, (27)
(classic approach, i.e. ‘without Crowther’). The supplier will now change
the scenario and act as a Stackelberg leader by proposing a price discount
scheme, prior to the vendor setting Q, with the aim to boost his own profits.
In a price discount scheme (β, γ), the vendor offers the buyer a reduced price
βw (β ≤ 1) on all units in the order, if and only if the buyer would order
in lot-sizes not smaller than some value γQ∗ (γ ≥ 1), where Q∗ can be
interpreted as that value that the buyer choses for a price discount scheme
γ = β = 1.
The buyer will not accept scheme (β < 1, γ > 1) if this lowers his profits
below what he could achieve in the status quo scenario, and will instead
continue ordering at Q∗ for unit price w. If he would accept and hence
receive the price βw, but is still free to choose the quantity, his optimal
quantity would be Q∗∗ =
√
2sby/(αbβw). Accepting the scheme thus implies
that the buyer orders Q∗∗∗ = max{γQ∗, Q∗∗}. Assuming, as in Joglekar
(1988), that the buyer will still accept the scheme when his profits are equal
to those obtained in the status quo scenario, allows the derivation of an
upper bound on the optimal value of β for any given γ, that the supplier
may propose if this is still beneficial to himself. To assert this, he will thus
determine m∗(Q∗∗∗) using (7) or (27), and check whether his profits under
the price discount scheme would increase relative to those he obtains in the
status quo setting. A simple search routine over a range of γ values in steps
of 0.01 has been used to produce the results presented in Table 2 for the
instances given in Table 1 (we take sp = 0). In column 7, 4Π is defined as
the difference in vendor profits Π between the price discount scheme and the
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Table 1: Problem instance characteristics
# y sb s w c
1 12,000 10 100 1.5 1.2
2 12,000 10 100 3.6 1.2
3 12,000 400 4 2.9 1.2
for each instance: αb = α = 0.2
status quo scenario, relative to vendor profits in the status quo scenario (and
multiplied by 100).
While the approach to derive the optimal discount scheme is independent
of the profit function that is used for the seller, the results found do depend
crucially on the choice of function. Numerical results are given in Table 2
whenever a price discount scheme can be found that would increase the ven-
dor’s profits by more than 0.10%. (In the other cases, the row contains ‘/’
entries.) Table 2 illustrates that if one does not account for the supplier’s
reward, the vendor sees less benefit in offering discounts, and the ‘optimal’
schemes are typically much less aggressive in lot-size quantities demanded
and price discounts offered. Note that 4Π in both frameworks may arbitrar-
ily increase by more than the percentages reported if fixed overhead costs
(which can be large in practice) would be accounted for.
Table 2: Optimal price-discount schemes for the vendor
# Model γ∗ β∗ Q∗∗∗ m∗(Q∗∗∗) 4Π(%) 4Π(%)(E)
1 With Crowther 3.65 0.986 3,267 1 3.45 1.29
1 Without Crowther 1.87 0.997 1,674 2 1.50 2.35
2 With Crowther 5.88 0.981 3,399 1 0.61 -1.72
2 Without Crowther / / / / <<0.1 /
3 With Crowther 1.53 0.994 6,226 1 0.72 -1.00
3 Without Crowther / / / / <<0.1 /
(E) When evaluating price discount scheme through the eyes of the other framework.
Table 2, last column, reports how the discount scheme is evaluated using
the other framework’s supplier function. If one believes that one should not
consider Crowther’s term, one would conclude that the NPV-derived discount
scheme will reduce the vendor’s profits in #2 and #3! If one accepts (6) as the
true profit function, then one sees more merit in the solutions that are arrived
at when ignoring the supplier’s reward, however one does not recognise them
as optimal.
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7.2. Impact of production cost
Imagine the following problem. The supplier receives an offer from a com-
pany that has a technology that can reduce the supplier’s variable production
costs c by x%. How large is the investment value B that the supplier should
be willing to pay this company now for acquiring this new technology and
use it to produce all future demand? The solution is clearly arrived at from
solving the following equation:
αB = 4Π, (28)
where 4Π is the net difference between the profit obtained using the new
technology and using the current technology. Assume for simplicity that the
company always produces lot-for-lot at an infinite rate. Then using (27),
(28) simplifies to B = xy/α, but using (6) gives B = x(y/α + Q/2). The
difference in willingness to pay values is hence:
4B
B
=
x(y/α +Q/2)− xy/α
xy/α
=
αQ
2y
. (29)
For α = 0.2 and Q/y = 0.2, recognising the supplier’s reward increases the
maximum value that the firm is prepared to pay with 2%, and for Q/y = 0.6
with 6%.
7.3. Joint lot-size optimisation
We use the seller-buyer situation of Section 7.1 (and sp = 0). The buyer,
selling to final customers at the unit price r, has the profit function:
Πb = (r − c)y − sb y
Q
− αbwQ
2
, (30)
while the seller, if not recognising Crowther’s term, has the profit function
(27). The joint profit function ΠJ is then:
ΠJ = (r − c)y − (sb + s
m
)
y
Q
− hbQ
2
− h(m− 1)Q
2
, (31)
where hb = αbw and h = αc. This model is as in Joglekar (1988). The joint
optimal lot-sizes are hence:
Q∗ =
√
2(sb + s/m∗)y
h(m∗ − s) + hb , (32)
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m∗ = b
1 +
√
1 + 4 s(hb−h)
sbh
2
c. (33)
Recognising the supplier’s reward, however, we use (6) for the seller’s
profit function, and provided that αb = α, their sum ΠJ is given by:
ΠJ = (r − c)y − (sb + s
m
)
y
Q
− hmQ
2
, (34)
where h = αc. The joint optimal lot-sizes are given by m∗ = 1 and:
Q∗ =
√
2(sb + s)y
h
. (35)
Table 3 reports the joint optimal lot-sizes for the instances of Table 1.
As the marginal profit terms are constant and the same in both classic and
NPV functions (with Crowther), we report the ‘logistics’ (lot-size dependent)
Average Costs as ACb = (r − w)y − Πb, AC = (w − c)y − Π, and ACJ =
(r − c)y − ΠJ .
Table 3: Solutions for joint lot-size optimisation in the buyer-vendor supply chain
# Method m∗ Q∗ ACb AC ACJ Side-payment(∗)
1 With Crowther 1 3,317 534 262 796 317
1 Without Crowther 2 1,633 318 563 882 72
2 With Crowther 1 3,317 1,230 -434 796 901
2 Without Crowther 4 764 432 668 1,100 21
3 With Crowther 1 6,356 2,598 -1,073 1,525 316
3 Without Crowther 1 4,089 2,360 12 2,371 0
(∗) Side-payment to buyer; see Section 7.4
When comparing to a ‘status quo’ situation in which the buyer first de-
cides on Q as to maximise his own profits, and then the vendor selects m as to
maximise his own profits, then the classic approach finds that the benefits of
joint optimisation remain modest (in fact, a reduction of total logistics costs
in the supply chain by 4.74%, 0.77%, and 0.00% for #1, #2, and #3, respec-
tively). In the NPV-derived model, these benefits are much larger (11.45%,
17.91%, and 9.18%, respectively). The negative costs for the vendor in the
NPV approach for #2 and #3 are due to the net opportunity cost being
negative as a consequence of the supplier’s reward.
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7.4. Side-payments
In order for two firms, say 1 and 2, to accept the solution that maximises
their joint profit compared to a status quo scenario, annuity stream side-
payments can be organised as to make the final profit distribution vector
an imputation, which is a sufficient condition for a two-player cooperative
game. If the Shapley value is selected, firm k ∈ {1, 2} is to pay 0.5(Π∗∗J −
Π∗J) − (Π∗∗k − Π∗k) > 0 to the other firm, where Π∗∗J and Π∗∗k are the global
profits and profits of firm k in the joint optimal solution, respectively, and
Π∗J and Π
∗
k are the global profits and profits of the firm k obtained in the
status quo scenario, respectively. (A negative side-payment means that k
receives this amount from the other firm.) Firm k incurs the final profits
Π∗k + 0.5(Π
∗∗
J −Π∗J) ≥ Π∗k, and thus prefers the joint optimal solution, which
is hence after these side-payments also a Nash equilibrium.
The last column of Table 3 shows the side-payments received by the buyer
for the examples of Section 7.3 in which the status-quo scenario is that the
buyer decides upon his optimal lot-size first. As can be observed, the classic
functions, not recognising opportunity rewards, significantly underestimate
the side-payments.
7.5. Five-echelon supply chain
Consider a five-echelon supply chain (SC) with the data as given in Table
4. In status quo, Q1 is first determined by firm 1 using (25); then m2Q1 = Q2
by firm 2; m3Q2 = Q3 by firm 3, and so on, using each time (24). The
joint optimal lot-sizes are simultaneously derived from the collective’s profit
function (26). Table 5 compares this approach (With Cr.) to the approach
without incorporating the supplier’s reward (Without Cr.). For each of the
firms, the supplier’s reward SR is explicitly listed in a separate column, while
the average costs AC reported consist of the set-up costs, holding costs, and
supplier’s rewards. AC∗ is this cost in status quo, and AC∗∗ the cost from
the joint optimisation of the lot-sizes.
Table 4: Instance characteristics for a five-echelon supply chain
Echelon 0 1 2 3 4 5
w 10 8 6 4 2 1
s / 20 30 40 50 60
y = 12, 000; for each firm: unit purchase price w;
set-up cost s; α = 0.2; e = 0.
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The difference between the results, see in Table 5, are significant. Crowther’s
term lowers the cost of the upstream suppliers in the status-quo scenario; it
even makes upstream suppliers in the supply chain optimal solution earn
negative logistics costs, i.e. a net profit, as their own inventory costs are
more than compensated by the inventory held at the downstream firm. By
including Crowther’s term the optimal lot-sizes in the joint optima are very
different, and are equal to those that would be found from multi-echelon
theory if one corrects the installation holding costs (Corollary 3). It can
be calculated that the SC net cost reduction from adopting the SC optimal
solution with Crowther’s term included is 58.4%, whereas without it, one
only arrives at 12.4%. In the eyes of the latter model, the lot-sizes found
using Crowther would lead to a net increase in total costs of 46.4%. Using
our functions to evaluate the classic solution without Crowther, the net cost
reduction would be 32.8%, i.e. much larger than 12.4% but much less than
the optimal solution.
Table 5: Solutions for the five-echelon supply chain
Method F irm Q∗ m∗ AC∗ SR∗(1) Q∗∗ m∗∗ AC∗∗ SR∗∗(1) Side-P. (∗)
With Cr. 1 548 / 876 0 4,899 / 3,968 0 3366.7
2 548 1 547 110 4,899 1 -906 980 -1178.8
3 1,096 2 548 110 4,899 1 -882 980 -1154.5
4 2,192 2 274 219 4,899 1 -857 980 -856.2
5 2,192 1 109 219 4,899 1 -343 490 -177.3
Without Cr. 1 548 / 876 / 1,319 / 1,237 / 435.5
2 548 1 657 / 1,319 1 273 / -309.3
3 1,096 2 657 / 1,319 1 364 / -218.5
4 2,192 2 493 / 2,638 2 491 / 76.1
5 2,192 1 328 / 2,638 1 273 / 19.2
(1) SR = supplier’s reward; ∗ Side-payment received
The last column of Table 5 lists the side-payments to be received (paid
out if negative) in the case that the firms each wish to receive a fifth of
the total profit gains from joint lot-size optimisation. The classic method
without Crowther is not fairly compensating the ‘retailer’ and the upstream
firms keep more than their fair share of profits. Indeed, even in the classic
approach they earn supplier’s rewards, it is just that this financial benefit
is not brought to light and hence not accounted for in the compensation
scheme.
If one would calculate the SC optimal policy from the multi-echelon total
profit function in which the correct transfer-price free unit holding costs
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are used, one will find the joint optimal lot-sizes but one cannot determine
the financial implications for the individual firms. The latter requires the
precise specification of the payment structures adopted between the firms in
the status-quo scenario, as well as those payment structures adopted in the
integrated scenario.
7.6. Unconventional payment structures
The profit function (10) was derived for the conventional payment struc-
ture (C). There are, however, payment structures that differ significantly
from these standard assumptions. Under full consignment (FC), the supplier
‘retains ownership’ of the inventory at its buyer and this is implemented by
letting the buyer pay the vendor the price w only at the moment a product
is actually sold. In the case of partial consignment (PC), the buyer pays c
to the vendor when products are delivered, and the remainder (w− c) when
the items are sold by the buyer. In the case of a trade credit, the buyer pays
c to the vendor when the products are delivered, say at time t, and pays the
remainder (w − c) after a grace period at time t+ zT (GP(z)), where z is a
suitably chosen constant.
Let us rewrite (10) by introducing unit parameters (we set sp = 0 for
simplicity):
Π = (w − c)y − sy
mQ
− αs
2
− h(m− 1)Q
2
+ hr
Q
2
, (36)
where h is the unit holding cost, hr is the financial unit supplier’s reward.
Assume that this supplier sells to a buyer with the normal EOQ problem as in
(30) but replacing αbw by hb. One can prove from the annuity stream profit
functions, following similar procedures as reported in Boyaci and Gallego
(2002) and Beullens and Janssens (2013), that in all these cases the buyer
and seller can use these profit functions provided that we redefine hb, h and
hr as given in Table 6.
Table 6: Parameter values in the buyer-vendor supply chain
Parameter C FC PC GP (z)
hb αbw 0 αbc αbc− αb(w − c)(1− 2z)
h αc αc αc αc
hr α(w − c) −αc 0 α(w − c)(1− 2z)
Note that under GP(z), the unit supplier’s reward is positive when z <
1/2, zero for z = 1/2, and negative when z > 1/2. The buyer’s unit holding
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cost also depends on the value of z, and can be negative for w >> c and
z > 1/2. Unconventional payment structures can hence change the unit
supplier’s reward from positive values into zero or negative values. In the
same manner, these payment structures can also change the normal unit
holding costs into zero or negative values. The FC and GP(z = 1) schemes
are also reported in Boyaci and Gallego (2002).
7.7. Underbuilding the theory for JELS
The model in Goyal (1976) is arguably one of the first dealing with what is
now known as the Joint Economic Lot Sizing Problem (JELS). The functions
are (using the notation of Section 6):
C1 =
s1y
Q
+ h1
Q
2
, (37)
C2 =
s2y
mQ
+ h2(m− 1)Q
2
, (38)
C1+2 = C1 + C2 = (s1 +
s2
m
)
y
Q
+ (h1 + h2(m− 1))Q
2
, (39)
for the costs of buyer, vendor, and the integrated supply chain, respectively.
It corresponds to the model we have compared with in Section 7.3, but using
constant unit holding costs h1 and h2. He compares a status-quo scenario,
in which the buyer first determines Q from (37), and giving this order, the
supplier then determines m from (38), with the integrated solution where
(Q,m) are simultaneously determined from (39). Based on this comparison,
he also develops a side-payment scheme so that both firms will fair better
from adopting the integrated solution.
Corollary 6. Under conventional payments, the model of Goyal cannot lead
to the determination of the benefit of an integrated approach in relation to an
uncoordinated approach. It follows that it cannot be determined how to share
the benefits of adopting the integrated solution among the participating firms.
Proof. If we assume conventional payments, then according to Harris, h1
should include the unit price w1 that the buyer pays the supplier, for any
value of w1. This will lead the buyer to find the correct lot-size in status-quo,
and since the supplier’s reward is then constant, the supplier will find the
correct value for m in status-quo. But then, as illustrated in Sections 7.3 and
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7.5, the joint optimal solution (m,Q) will in general not be found since (39)
does not represent the true joint cost function. Hence, the side-payments
will also be miscalculated (as in e.g. Section 7.4).
On the other hand, according to the principles of Clark’s multi-echelon
theory, we can postulate that (39) is based on installation holding costs, hence
be as in (26), and then h1 will not be based on w1 but on the unit cost price w2
of the supplier (Corollary 3); the joint optimal solution (m,Q) will hence be
correctly identified. However, (37) and (38) then merely represent installation
cost functions, which are not equal to the firms’ true cost functions under
conventional payments, unless the supplier operates at a net loss (Corollary
4), i.e. w1 = w2 + e2 in this case. But Goyal’s model should stand for any
value w1. Hence the status-quo solution, as well as the side-payments, will
be miscalculated. 
What is missing in the literature is the specification of the assumptions
under which Goyal’s model holds. Table 6 helps to clarify this: under con-
ventional payment or full consignment, the model should be corrected by
including a positive or negative supplier’s reward, respectively.
Goyal’s model stands, however, when the payment structure is partial
consignment (PC), see Table 6. In that case, the supplier gives away his
Crowther’s supplier’s reward to his buyer. Both the holding cost at the buyer
and at the supplier are then independent of the transfer price, and insofar
the cost price c remains constant, they can indeed be taken as constants.
The other case in which Goyal’s model applies is when using a grace period
with z = 1/2 (GP(z = 1/2)), see Table 6. Payment of the mark-up (w− c)Q
has to occur halfway through the inventory cycle. The implications to buyer
and vendor with respect to their NPV profit functions are then exactly the
same as under partial consignment.
The practical implementation of both PC and GP(z = 1/2) may be more
complicated then when applying conventional payments (C). Only sellers
who have sufficient liquidity can offer these schemes to their buyers, since
the money they receive upon the delivery of the batch to their customers
only covers their unit costs. At that point in time, sellers have made a net
loss since they have to carry their logistics costs as well as their allocated
overhead costs (which are typically not included in the models but may be a
significant part of their overall cost structure).
GP(z = 1/2) has the additional drawback that, in practise, one has to
establish when the next order of the buyer will be placed in order to find out
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when the payment is due. If it turns out that the buyer actually pays later
than halfway into the inventory cycle, his holding costs go down, which will
encourage him to buy in larger and larger lot sizes. This would not be in the
best interests of the supplier, who would then need to be in an even better
cash position in order to give this larger credit to its buyers. For z > 1/2
values, the buyer’s unit holding cost could in fact become lower than that of
the supplier, and even may become negative depending on the value of z and
the mark-up (w − c). This will give the seller an incentive to specify a fixed
credit delay for the buyer instead, but in that case we no longer have the
GP scheme but are back to a conventional payment structure (with constant
credit delay) and where a non-zero supplier’s reward would have to be taken
into account.
8. Further key results
Further insightful demonstrations about the usefulness of NPV-thinking
on revealing the demand-size implications to lot sizing are found in the fol-
lowing articles. That holding costs may need to be valued at sale price and
not cost price, in certain situations, was first proven in Grubbstro¨m (1980).
Beullens and Janssens (2011) provide another NPV solution to this model
and show how both solutions can be seen to include Crowther’s supplier re-
ward. Boyaci and Gallego (2002) show the relevance of (10) for deriving
an optimal revenue-sharing contract for the model of Roundy (1985). It is
valuable to apply this approach to the problem in Chen et al. (2001); we
think this leads to a much simpler derivation of results. Non-zero lead-times
also produce effects similar to Crowther’s, see Grubbstro¨m and Thorsten-
son (1986) and Beullens and Janssens (2011). Beullens and Janssens (2013)
show the implications of different uncoventional payment structures for the
EOQ model, the EPQ model Taft (1918), and the model of Joglekar (1988).
Similar reward effects as identified by Crowther are identified. An NPV in-
terpretation for the unit backorder cost, α(w−c), is obtained in Grubbstro¨m
(1998), hence very similar to Crowther’s. As backorders delay revenues, it
may hence reduce Crowther’s positive effects, but exact analytical relation-
ships are yet not available. Insight into Crowther’s reward effect in stochastic
models is not yet established. Using NPV, Haneveld and Teunter (1998) and
Farvid and Rosling (2014) derive valid objective functions from which to de-
rive inventory policies, but do not derive profit functions that indicate how a
firm could make profits from changing demand patterns. Their models lack a
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lot-size effect in the demand, an effect probably needed to arrive at impacts
as significant as in Theorem 1. The model in Porteus (1985) is in this re-
spect a better first candidate to demonstrate the implications derivable with
respect to Crowther’s insight. See also Section 10.
9. Crowther in the literature
Crowther is briefly mentioned in the reviews on quantity discounts of
Dolan (1987), Benton and Park (1996), Munson and Rosenblatt (1998), and
Viswanathan and Wang (2003), but his model is not discussed in detail
nor reproduced. Most of the papers that classify themselves as following
Crowther, actually follow the approach of Dolan (1978), including Lal and
Staelin (1984); Dada and Srikanth (1987); Kohli and Park (1989, 1994); Lam
and Wong (1996); Wang and Wu (2000); Wang (2002, 2005). The original
meaning of the supplier’s reward has eroded as +α(w − c) is replaced by a
single parameter ‘h’.
As a result of the substition by ‘h’, the meaning of Crowther’s term
seems often misunderstood. Gurnani (2001), claiming to follow Crowther,
changes its sign from positive (a reward) to negative (a cost). Crowther’s
model is almost exclusively applied without the consideration of the firm’s
traditional holding costs. Wang (2005) aims to integrate Crowther’s model
into a function akin to (10), but uses the same ‘h’ in the classic holding cost
term and in Crowther’s term, and this would only be valid under conventional
payments in the special case that w = 2c.
In reviews on supply chain coordination models with lot sizing compo-
nents, Crowther is not always present. He is briefly mentioned in Goyal
and Gupta (1989), but absent from Thomas and Griffin (1996) and Maloni
and Benton (1997), whereas Monahan and models extending his main model
are more prominently featured. In Sarmah et al. (2006), Crowther is men-
tioned, and Drezner and Wesolowsky (1989) and Boyaci and Gallego (2002)
are briefly discussed, while models following Monahan are explicitly repro-
duced. It does not report the findings in Boyaci and Gallego (2002) with re-
spect to these models. Li and Wang (2007) mentions Crowther (1964) briefly,
but not Drezner and Wesolowsky (1989) nor Boyaci and Gallego (2002), and
devotes much more space reviewing articles following on from Monahan.
In the JELS reviews of Ben-Daya et al. (2008) and Glock (2012), Crowther
is not mentioned. This is understandable in the sense that they did not
address the problem that Crowther was addressing. However, we now know
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that his model is of relevance to these problems as well, in particular whenever
the joint optimal solution is to be compared with a case of no coordination, or
the benefits from joint optimisation have to be distributed. An undoubtedly
fruitful line of further investigation would be to re-examine the lot sizing
models reviewed in all the above articles.
Andriolo et al. (2014) offer a comprehensive review on EOQ and EPQ
models, but excludes literature on JELS models. It is the first review in
which the NPV approach is prominently present. It includes price-discounts
and trade credits (permissible delays of payment) but from the buyer’s per-
spective. The review of key findings presented in this paper derived from
NPV is therefore complementary to Andriolo et al. (2014), and points to-
wards an additional important research direction.
There are numerous recent articles which are not accounting for Crowther’s
reward effect, and hence it is uncertain whether these can be brought in line
with NPV thinking. For example: in Shin and Benton (2007) a discount ap-
proach is investigated based on a model which in essence leads to the same
discrepancies as reported in Section 7.1; in Esmaeili et al. (2009) seller-buyer
Stackelberg games are developed based on a model that has the same defi-
ciencies as reported in Section 7.3; in Bylka (2009) production and shipment
lot sizes are determined in a buyer-seller model that has the shortcomings of
the JELS model reported in Section 7.7; in Sana (2012) a 3-echelon supply
chain is investigated that has the problems as reported in Section 7.5; and
Ke and Bookbinder (2012) claim to use Crowther but consider it to be a cost
rather than a reward. These are just a few examples of a large set of litera-
ture. This paper demonstrates that the four key papers of Harris, Crowther,
Clark, and Monahan (when including his last refinements) are in line with
NPV principles, and it seems logical to expect that all other lot sizing mod-
els derived from them should also have this characteristic. By acknowledging
Crowther’s contribution, while recognising that it may change its shape de-
pending on payment structures, future research can avoid falling into these
inconsistencies and give better assurance of helping firms to maximise the
NPV of their lot sizing activities.
10. The EOQ for regenerative procurement and sales processes
We develop some new results, not with the intention to provide a full
characterisation of the problem nor to derive any inventory policies, but with
the aim to convey that Crowther’s insight can be generalised to stochastic
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settings. We deviate from previous notation in that we assign a different
interpretation to the indices p and s, as explained further.
A firm purchases goods, adds value, and then sells them on to other firms.
Let c be the unit price it has to pay its supplier, and e be the unit cost of
additional value added by some production process working at infinite rate.
The firm, in an aim to make profits, sells the goods at a unit price w and at a
constant rate of y(w) units per year. Sales occurs in lot-sizes according to a
regenerative process with i.i.d. cycle times {Ts1,Ts2, ...}. Let Qs and Ts be two
random variables representing the lot-size and cycle time, respectively. For
any particular realisation of the ith cycle time Tsi, let Qsi = y(w)Tsi be the
corresponding lot-size required, where Qs1 would be delivered at time 0, Qs2
at a time Ts1, Qs3 at time Ts1 + Ts2, etc. Procurement and production occur
according to another regerative process with i.i.d. cycle times {Tp1,Tp2, ...}
characterised by the random variables Qp and Tp and such that for the i
th
cycle time Tpi, we have Qpi = y(w)Tpi, where Qp1 would be obtained at
time 0, Qp2 at a time Tp1, Qp3 at time Tp1 + Tp2, etc. Let E[x] denote the
mean, σ2(x) the variance, and c2v(x) = σ
2(x)/(E[x])2 the squared coefficient
of variation of random variable x.
The set-up cost associated with Qsi is the constant ss, and the revenue
received is wQsi; the set-up cost for a batch Qpi is the constant sp, and the
cost incurred is (c+e)Qpi. These payments occur when the batch is delivered
or obtained, respectively. It is clear that the expected value of the annuity
stream profit function of the firm is to be of the following form:
E[AS] = −αsp
(
1 +
∞∑
i=1
E[e−αYp ]
)− αss(1 + ∞∑
i=1
E[e−αYs ]
)
−α(c+ e)y(w)(E[Ts1] + ∞∑
i=1
E[Ts(i+1)e
−αYs ]
)
+αwy(w)
(
E[Tp1] +
∞∑
i=1
E[Tp(i+1)e
−αYp ]
)− Ess − Ebb, (40)
where
Yx =
i∑
j=1
Txj, (41)
and Ess is the expected annual cost of safety stock, and Ebb the expected
annual cost of delayed revenue from backorders. Porteus (1985) (Lemma 1)
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shows how, from the knowledge of the (cumulative) distribution functions
of Tp, Ts, Qp and Qs, and the application of the Laplace-Stieltjes transform
methodology, one can find an explicit characterisation of E[AS] (in fact ap-
plicable for any first n cycles), save for Ess and Ebb. However, in the context
of comparing with classic average cost inventory models, it is more useful to
consider the linear approximation in α of this function (Grubbstro¨m, 1980).
We write E[AS], the expected annuity stream profit function, as Π.
Theorem 2. The linear approximation in α of the expected annuity stream
profit function of the firm facing regenarative procurement and sales pro-
cesses, is of the following form:
Π = (w − c)y(w)− Ess − Ebb
−spy(w)
E[Qp]
− ssy(w)
E[Qs]
− αsp
2
(1 + c2v(Qp))− α
ss
2
(1 + c2v(Qs))
−α(c+ e)E[Qp]
2
(1 + c2v(Qp)) + αw
E[Qs]
2
(1 + c2v(Qs)). (42)
Proof. By direct application of Theorem 1 in Porteus (1985), and rearrang-
ing terms. 
We note that (42) generalises (5), or conversely, that we can derive The-
orem 1 as a special (deterministic) case of Theorem 2.
Current stochastic models do not include the revenue term in their ob-
jective function, which is valid if the stochastic demand process is assumed
given and not subject to change, and for the same reason the supplier’s rev-
enue reward (the last term in αw) is not needed. However, as shown by (42),
firms should find it in their interest to try to influence the sales lot size’s av-
erage and its variability, as to increase the last term. The way in which this
should be done will depend on both procurement and sales processes. Both
lot sizing problems are connected, of course, since in order to reach adequate
service levels, a firm must make sure that cumulative amounts purchased
(including safety stock) can, at any realisation of demand, reasonably meet
cumulative sales (including outstanding backorders).
The function (42) shows, even under the classic assumption of uncontrol-
lable demand, that the financial cost to the firm of ‘keeping stock’ is related
to E[Qp](1+c
2
v(Qp))/2, which is not the average inventory that the firm holds
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(as it clearly isn’t). A similar finding was reported in Section 3. One can
think of it as the average echelon stock of the firm, similar to the interpreta-
tion provided in Section 6. However, both Theorem 2 and Theorem 1 prove
that this is an unsatifactory interpretation in the light that we have had no
need to specify what actually happens downstream once the products are
sold on to the next firm. For the same reason, E[Qs](1 + c
2
v(Qs))/2 does not
automatically need to carry the interpretation as an average (echelon) stock
held by the next firm.
Let us define a perfect just-in-time and agile supply process as a procure-
ment/production process with zero set-up costs for procurement/production
orders, and with an infinite production rate of unlimited output capacity
available at all times; and a service-oriented firm as a firm that does not
consider it in to be in its long-term interest to create backorders in the pur-
suit of short-term profit, out of fear of loosing customers.
Theorem 3. The service-oriented firm with a perfect just-in-time and agile
supply process facing a regenerative sales process has an expected average
profit function:
Π = (w − c)y(w)− ssy(w)
E[Qs]
−αss
2
(1 + c2v(Qs)) + α(w − c− e)
E[Qs]
2
(1 + c2v(Qs)). (43)
Proof. Having this perfect process means that sp = 0 and that chasing
demand is then clearly the ideal strategy for the firm. The firm will choose
Qpi to be exactly equal to Qsi, and has no need to keep lot size and safety
stock and can always meet demand without backorders. Hence (42) simplifies
to (43). 
The model obtained is a stochastic version of the interpretation of Drezner
and Wesolowsky (1989) of the model of Crowther (1964) (see Section 4). Such
a firm will find it of value to focus on revenue management. It shows that,
even if y is constant, the firm may find value in sales strategies that either
stimulate buyers to purchase in larger batches on average (e.g. quantity
discounts), or in larger batches on occasions only (e.g. sales promotions)
(meaning that they then buy in smaller lot sizes at other times). The main
insight of Crowther, that larger batch quantities offer the potential to increase
the firm’s profits, is still preserved, but will need a more careful treatment
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in terms of which strategies are best deployed. Indeed, the potential of these
strategies, and the best mix of sales strategies, are clearly linked to how the
distribution function of the process will be affected by these sales strategies.
11. Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the history of some important contributions but
of which the wider implications to lot sizing have somehow not been picked
up in the mainstream literature. Next to presenting a detailed account of
how the original models proposed by Harris, Crowther, Monahan, and the
multi-echelon concepts of Clark, are connected, and are in spirit all in line
with NPV principles, we find that credit has to be attributed in particu-
lar to Drezner and Wesolowsky, for their more accurate reformulation of
Crowther’s insight, and to Boyaci and Gallego, for pointing out its relevance
in supply chain coordination problems, as well as to other authors who have
contributed to developing the NPV approach. We have further strength-
ened the case for unification, and adoption of Crowther’s contribution, by
presenting several examples that help quantify the discrepancies which are
still present in current research. We have also demonstrated that Crowther’s
insight is transferable to stochastic models.
In relation to further research, and in the presentation in textbooks and
review articles, we believe that the findings presented are very important.
The model of Section 3 offers a simple pathway towards a unified lot siz-
ing approach in textbooks, and provides links back to Harris’ original EOQ
problem and his comment about irregular demand patterns, as well as to
Crowther, whose contribution we find of almost equal significance in the
light of understanding the effect of lot sizing on a firm’s profit function. We
have left out in our discussion the impact of out-of-pocket holding costs,
since neither Harris, Crowther nor Monahan considered these costs. Includ-
ing them merely adds an additional ‘classic’ holding cost term to a firm’s
profit function, see e.g. Boyaci and Gallego (2002) and also Beullens and
Janssens (2013).
It is also important to point out that these findings should be interpreted
with care as they are subject to the particular additional assumptions that
were needed to construct the NPV model with which a classic model is com-
pared. There are in principle an infinite number of NPV reference models
we could use to compare a classic model with and, for some of these NPV
models not yet explored, equivalence of the classic model may hold. The
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quest for finding (repairable) equivalence is further explained and illustrated
in Beullens and Janssens (2013), and they call the method NPV Equivalence
Analysis (NPVEA). The message perhaps is that we have not always been
careful enough to specify the context in which a particular classic (or NPV)
model is applicable. What NPVEA can offer is a deeper understanding of
which assumptions we need to make explicit, and when adaptations to clas-
sic models are desirable. We have included an example in Section 7.7. A
more intensive use of NPV modelling in textbooks on lot sizing to derive
the impact of payment structures on inventory theory, seems therefore also
recommendable.
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